Because learned associations are quickly renewed following extinction, the extinction process must include processes other than unlearning. However, reinforcement learning models, such as the temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL) model, treat extinction as an unlearning of associated value and are thus unable to capture renewal. TDRL models are based on the hypothesis that dopamine carries a reward prediction error signal; these models predict reward by driving that reward error to zero. The authors construct a TDRL model that can accommodate extinction and renewal through two simple processes: (a) a TDRL process that learns the value of situation-action pairs and (b) a situation recognition process that categorizes the observed cues into situations. This model has implications for dysfunctional states, including relapse after addiction and problem gambling.
Temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL) algorithms have gained popularity in behavioral neuroscience to explain conditioning tasks. These models learn to select actions and to make decisions. Generally, these models do this by predicting the expected value (expected future reward) of taking an action from a given recognized situation (termed a state of the world). If the agent (the animal or simulation) knows the value of the consequences of its actions, it can take an action to maximize that value. Estimated value is updated through a value-prediction error term, ␦, defined as the difference between expected and observed changes in value (Sutton & Barto, 1998) . Positive ␦ indicates that the value observed is better than expected, and the estimated value of the sequence of actions and observations leading up to the event should be increased. Negative ␦ indicates that the value observed is worse than expected, and the estimated value of the sequence of actions and observations should be decreased (see Figure 1 ). The strongest support for TDRL models lies in the similarity of the dopamine signal to the value-prediction error term ␦ (Barto, 1995; Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Montague, Dayan, Person, & Sejnowski, 1995; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, 2002; Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001 ). TDRL models have recently found additional support from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments that have examined changes in value under careful economic controls (McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; O'Doherty, 2004; Paulus, Feinstein, Tapert, & Liu, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004) .
Because associations are so easily reinstated after extinction (Bouton, 2004; Pavlov, 1927; Rescorla, 2004) , extinction cannot entail unlearning of the original association (Bouton, 2004; Pavlov, 1927) . However, standard associative models do not differentiate learning from unlearning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . TDRL models are generalizations of associative models (Sutton & Barto, 1981) and also do not differentiate learning from unlearning Suri, 2002) : A missing reward produces ␦ Ͻ 0, which produces a decrease in value (expectation of reward), which produces a decrease in action selection. Although these models do successfully capture the slow decrease of responding that characterizes the extinction process Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Suri, 2002) , they are unable to capture the quick "relearning" that is renewal.
The direct increase and decrease of estimated value as a function of the observed value-prediction error term ␦ will converge under appropriate learning conditions on an accurate estimate of the true value (Sutton & Barto, 1998) , given the assumption of a completely described, stationary, stable world. However, that assumption clearly does not hold for real animals interacting with the real world. The real world is not completely described-which variables are available, which are important, which are unimportant, and which are hidden must be derived by the agent. In an extinction experiment, there is an explicit hidden variable unbeknownst to the animal (i.e., the experimenter has changed the reward contingency). It is our contention that the existence of hidden variables is ubiquitous in an animal's interaction with the real world and that animals have evolved mechanisms to handle this nonstationarity by categorization processes that enable the identification of (and reaction to) changes in reward contingency without unlearning.
TDRL models rely on the notion of state (Daw, Courville, & Touretzky, 2006; Sutton & Barto, 1998) . In behavioral terms, a state is the recognition that the agent's current situation shares properties with previous (similar) situations. State is thus a categorization of the agent's current situation as a member of a class of similar situations. In practice, a state is a representative collection of salient observations that might include notable events, environmental configurations, actions, et cetera. States can include both spatial and temporal extents. Each unique state is associated with a value representing the time-discounted future reward that a behaving animal would expect when starting from that state. Any implementation of TDRL in the animal brain would have to include a representation of the state itself, a representation of the time the animal had been in the state, and an expected value of the state . From this information, the animal could predict the expected reward and make appropriate actions accordingly.
Theory: Implications of Two Processes TDRL thus depends on two processes: an evaluation function that determines the value of taking an action given that the agent is in a certain situation (or state) and a situation recognition process that categorizes the observable cues into "situations" from which to reason.
A typical conditioning experiment consists of two phases: the acquisition phase and the extinction phase. The acquisition phase entails the development of an association and is learned through the increase in the value estimate associated with observation of the conditioned stimulus. We propose that the extinction phase entails the development of a new (parallel) state space that can then contain a different value estimate.
Thus, we hypothesized that tonically low ␦ produces a "splitting" of the representation of the state, such that new states are created that can be differentiated from the original state (s). Because these new states are different from s, actions taken can have different consequences associated with the new states compared with those of state s. Similarly, the same actions taken from s and the new states can have different estimated values.
Because the splitting of the state space is dependent on low ␦, it only occurs as a consequence of a lack of expected reward. Thus, if we compare two experiments in which an animal is faced with two contexts, one in which reward is provided in both contexts and another in which reward is provided in only the first context, the model splits only the state in the situation in which reward is not provided in the second context. As shown in Figure 4 , this produces context-dependent extinction and renewal in the second simulation.
Any mechanism that produces development of a new state in response to repeatedly low ␦ would produce the appropriate extinction with renewal. We have built a model based on increased attention to cues in response to low ␦ for simulation purposes, but it is important to note that any model that produces state changes in response to the undelivered, expected reward would produce similar results. In temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL), an agent receives sensory cues, including specialized sensory cues (identified as rewards), processes those cues, and acts upon them. From the cues, the agent must represent a (possibly distributed) state hypothesis. Value hypotheses and action selections can be made from those state hypotheses. The difference between expected and observed values is calculated as the value-prediction error ␦ term, which is fed back to inform the state, value, and action processing. VTA ϭ ventral tegmental area; SNc ϭ substantia nigra, pars compacta. A color version of this figure is available on the Web at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/[articleDOI].supp
Model
All simulations were performed with the same agent model.
1
Manipulations were made to the cues provided (particularly the contextual cues) and to the probability of reward receipt. Each situation was identified by a set of cues (a context cue [A or B] , binary state-identification cues [e.g., 0, 1, 0], a magnitude-ofreward-delivered cue, and a time-since-last-reward cue). The timesince-last-reward cue was reset to zero on entry into a new environment or condition. All cues were treated identically by the agent. A small amount of noise (1%) was added to each cue on each time step.
The agent itself consisted of two components: a stateclassification component (implemented as a radial-basis competitive learning model with expansion; Bishop, 1995; Duda et al., 2001; Grossberg, 1976; Hertz, Krogh, & Palmer, 1991 ) and a temporal difference learning component (implemented as a Q-learning model by using Q [s, a] ; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Szepesvári & Littman, 1999) .
The state-classification model used for the agent was based on standard competitive learning algorithms (Grossberg, 1976; Hertz et al., 1991) that were based on radial-basis functions (Bishop, 1995; Hertz et al., 1991) with classifier expansion (Duda et al., 2001; Hertz et al., 1991) . At each time step, the actual situation in the world provided the agent with a multidimensional cue,
where s W was the binary state-identification cue (e.g., light on, sound off, house light on), R was the magnitude of reward delivered in that time step, and was the zero-mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation, CN . Also, was a vector of dimension n c ϭ length (s W ) ϩ 3. For numerical stability, context and state identifying binary cues were either 0 or 100; time since last reward was an integer identifying the number of time steps since the agent last received reward. The activation h(s A ) of each potential agent state s A was calculated through the following three steps:
Z(c(t)) measures the difference between the current set of cues c(t) and the mean for the prototype for state i, i . This distance was weighted by the cue weight w A . (In this formulation, c(t), i , and w A are all tuples of size n c ; see Equation 1.) D 2 (c(t)) transformed this by the covariance matrix for state i, ⌺ i . This measure is the Mahalanobis distance, after the dimensions have been stretched or compressed through the weighting function w k . P(c(t)|s i ) transforms D 2 (c(t)) into a Gaussian distribution; P(c(t)|s i ) is normalized so that under normal conditions (when @ k w k ϭ 1). P(c(t)|s i ) measures the probability that the current set of cues c(t) could have been drawn from a multivariate normal of n c dimensions centered at i with covariance matrix ⌺ i (Duda et al., 2001) .
If any state had a stronger activation than threshold ( s ), then the state with maximal activation was identified as the current agent state. If no state had a stronger activation than threshold ( s ), a new state was created with center ϭ c(t) and spherical covariance matrix with variance 0 ϭ 25.
Once more than 100 observations were classified as part of a state, the parameters for each state were updated at each time step. For each cue, i was updated to the mean of all observations classified as state s i , and ⌺ i was updated to the covariance matrix of all observations classified as state s i . Thus a state with highly consistent observations would tighten its variance to match those observations, whereas a state with very variable observations would expand its variance to cover a large range of cues. Once more than 100 observations had been observed in the world, the attention parameter w k (cue weight for cue k) was also updated on each time step on the basis of the information that cue provided to the state space:
I M (C k , S) was the mutual information between the cues and the states, defined as the increase in entropy in the observed cue distribution. H(C k ) was the total entropy of all observations in the cue space, and H(C k i ) was the entropy over those observations that were categorized as being in state s i .
Thus cues that provided no information to the state space were ignored. cw was a parameter that controlled the slope of the sigmoid. Cue weight w k is a form of attention and was modified by tonic levels of ␦. (See Equation 13 .)
The TDRL model used for the agent was based on standard Q-learning value-prediction methods (Sutton & Barto, 1998) . For each state, 2 an expected value 3 of taking action a was stored, V(s, a). Newly created states had all expected values set to zero. Expected value was updated using standard one-step temporal difference algorithms Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Sutton & Barto, 1998) .
On each time step, an action was selected on the basis of a standard softmax selection process (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Dayan & Abbott, 2001) ,
1 The simulations reported here were performed using Matlab R2006b and are publicly available from http://web.ahc.umn.edu/ϳredish/ TDRLXT-Simulations.zip 2 Remember, states are internal to the agent-they are categorizations of cues provided by the world. They reflect regularities in the world, but they do not necessarily have direct correspondence to experimenter-introduced "world states."
3 Typical formulations of value as a function of state-action pairs are termed Q-learning to differentiate them from values based only on states. We prefer to use the term V(s, a) to reflect that these are "values."
where s(t) was the agent's current state; and ␤ was a parameter that balanced exploration and exploitation (Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Doya, 2002) . High ␤ drove the agent to be more likely to select the high-value action, whereas low ␤ made the agent more likely to select actions more randomly.
On every time step, ␦ was calculated as the difference between the expected value of the previous state-action pair and the observed value, ␦͑t͒ ϭ ␥͑max a ͑V͑s͑t͒,a͒͒ ϩ R͑t͒͒ Ϫ V͑s͑t Ϫ 1͒,a͒, (10) where V(s, a) was the stored value of taking action a from state s, and ␥ was a discounting parameter set to 0.25. 4 In the TDRL component, ␦ adjusted the value estimate of the agent's hypothesized state via the standard temporal difference reinforcement learning rule,
where was a learning rate parameter, set to 0.05. ␦ was defined as an exponentially decaying running average of recent ␦ signals that were Ͻ 0:
where ␦ indicates rectification at 0, such that 1 ϭ 0 but Ϫ1 ϭ Ϫ1. 0 and 1 were parameters controlling the speed at which ␦ could change. We explored allowing ␦ to control key parameters in the equations above, including the distribution of attention to cues (Equation 5), the acceptable width of the radial-basis function i (Equation 4), and the exploration/exploitation parameter ␤ (Equation 9). However, we found that ␦ controlling the attention to cues (Equation 5) was the most stable and was sufficient to produce all the necessary results. This is therefore the version we report here:
Theoretically, ␦ could range from 0 to Ϫϱ, approaching Ϫϱ as the agent started missing rewards. As ␦ 3 Ϫϱ, tanh(␦ / DB ) 3 Ϫ1, the effective w k 3 1. As ␦ 3 0, tanh(␦ / DB ) 3 0, the effective w k 3 w k , which was normally Ͻ1. Thus, when the agent missed expected rewards, it began to pay closer attention to the cues. This made the agent more likely to create a new state hypothesis as described above. DB was a standard squashing parameter, controlling the slope at which changes in ␦ affected w k . The parameters used in the simulations are summarized in Table 1 .
Simulation 1: Acquisition of a Response
The first simulation (acquisition) simply tested the simulation's ability to acquire a response. It simulates a simple FR1 experiment. The world consisted of two situations and 10 actions (see Figure  2) . If the agent took Action 1 when the world was in Situation 0 (S0), it received reward (R) with probability (P), and the world transitioned to Situation 1 (S1). Under any other condition, the world returned to Situation S0. Actions 2-10 simulate other things the agent can do in the environment (sleep, run around, groom, etc.) . Simulated agents (N ϭ 50) were run under conditions of (R ϭ 1, P(R) ϭ 1), indicating a reward of 1 with probability of delivery of the reward of 1, and (R ϭ 0, P(R) ϭ 0) for 250 time steps. We measured the number of reward attempts by measuring the proportion of times in which the agent selected Action 1 from S0.
Simulation 2: Extinction With Renewal
This simulation tested the basic extinction with renewal result. In the same world from Simulation 1, each agent experienced 250 time steps in an acquisition condition in Context A (Action 1 in state S0 led to reward R ϭ 1, P(R) ϭ 1). Then, agents were potentially moved to an extinction condition. Some agents were moved to a new context (Context B), and some agents remained within the same context (Context A). The two contexts were identical except for the context cue. Some agents received reward (R ϭ 1, P(R) ϭ 1) in the potential extinction condition, and other agents did not (P(R) ϭ 0). Agents remained in the potential extinction condition for 250 time steps. Finally, all agents were returned to Context A for 250 time steps, in which they all had the opportunity to respond for reward again (renewal: R ϭ 1,P(R) ϭ 1). Agents (N ϭ 50) were run under each condition (reward in Context A during potential extinction condition, no reward in Context A during potential extinction condition, reward in Context B, no reward in Context B).
Simulation 3: Nonrewarded Cued Renewal
This simulation tested the effect of returning the agent to a familiar environment without reward. In the same world from Simulation 1, each agent experienced 250 time steps in an acquisition condition in Context A (Action 1 in state S0 led to reward R ϭ 1, P(R) ϭ 1). The association was then extinguished for 250 time steps in Context B, just as in Simulation 2. The agents were 4 We used a discount factor of 0.25 because the world model did not include a long intertrial interval (ITI) separating each trial (see Figure 2 ). Adding such an ITI state does not change the results, but it increases the complexity of the simulations unnecessarily. Discount factors as high as 0.90 provide qualitatively similar results to those presented here. then returned to Context A, but no reward was provided. Agents (N ϭ 50) were run, and the proportion of times in which the agent selected Action 1 in S0 was measured.
Simulation 4: The Partial Reinforcement Extinction Effect (PREE)
This simulation tested the effect of partial reinforcement on extinction. In the same world as in Simulation 1, agents experienced 750 time steps in an acquisition paradigm, followed by 250 time steps in an extinction paradigm. Four partial reinforcement paradigms were tested (P(R) ʦ (1.0, 0.75,0.50,0.25)). The reward received on each successful attempt (taking Action 1 in S0) was titrated so that the total average reward expected from full responding was held constant. Thus, the agents experiencing P(R) ϭ 1.00 received one unit of reward each time the world delivered reward, whereas agents experiencing P(R) ϭ 0.25 received four units of reward each time the world delivered reward. Extinction occurred in the same context with the same cues as acquisition. Agents (N ϭ 50) were run under each condition. Proportion of extinction was measured as the mean number of attempts per unit of time in the first 100 steps of the extinction condition divided by the mean number of attempts per unit of time in the last 50 steps of the training condition.
Simulation 5: PREE With Intervening Continuous Reinforcement
This simulation replicated the results of Jenkins (1962) and Theios (1962) , in which a continuous reinforcement condition was interposed between the partial reinforcement condition and the extinction condition. Agents experienced 750 time steps in a partially reinforced acquisition paradigm (identical to that in Simulation 4), followed by 150 time steps in a full reinforcement paradigm, R ϭ 1, P(R) ϭ 1, followed by 250 time steps in an extinction paradigm (as in Simulation 4). Extinction was measured (as in Simulation 4) as the ratio of attempts after extinction to the number of attempts at the end of the partial training condition (i.e., the continuous reinforcement condition was not included in the measurement).
Simulation 6: Problem Gambling
In order to examine the impact of state categorization on problem gambling, agents were allowed to experience the basic singlechoice world (Figure 2 ). Agents were first allowed 250 steps in the world with R ϭ 0.6, P(R) ϭ 0.1. In order to simulate the cost of playing, taking Action 1 under any condition entailed a cost, assessed as a negative reward (cost ϭ Ϫ0.50). This meant that if the agent regularly took Action 1 in S0, it would lose an average of 0.44 per try. Agents were then put into a world with a R ϭ payout, P(R) ϭ 0.50 for 100 time steps, where payout was 5, 10, 25, or 100, depending on the trial (different payouts were tried for different agents, but each agent experienced only a single payout size. This was done to simplify simulations and does not change the results). Afterward, agents were then allowed 250 steps under the original conditions (i.e., R ϭ 0.6, P(R) ϭ 0.10). Because the number of wins changed randomly between agents, we used regression statistics to examine the effects of number of wins, the total payout, and the variance of winning on the agents' likelihood to continue playing. Agents (N ϭ 50) were run under each condition.
Results

Acquisition
When faced with no reward, agents selected all actions randomly. Individual differences between agent responses arose from noise in the cues provided and in the action-selection process (see the Method section). Because there were 10 actions available, random chance produced a 10% chance of selecting Action 1 in S0. In contrast, when receiving reward on each attempt, the agents learned to increase the probability of attempting reward (see Figure 3) . Because the ␤ parameter continued to drive some exploration as well as some exploitation, maximal responding approached but did not reach 100%. The slope of the increase depended directly on the learning rate and less directly on other parameters. The maximum response depended primarily on the exploration-exploitation parameter ␤. Agents tended to categorize the two situations (S0, S1; see Figure 2 ) into two internal states. However, some agents used three or four states to represent the environment. In these cases, agents split the categorization of either S0 or S1 into multiple states.
Extinction With Renewal
Once the agent has learned to select the appropriate action in the appropriate situation, it does not need to relearn this association if Figure 4 shows the responses made by agents when faced with either reward or no reward in the new context. Agents that continued to get reward in the new context continued to respond at high rates, whereas agents that did not receive reward in the new context dropped their response rates back to random (10%). However, both groups responded at high rates when returned to the original context. Note the very fast reacquisition of the response in the renewal condition for the extinction groups.
This fast reacquisition occurred because the extinction group did not forget the association learned in the acquisition condition. Instead, they created new internal representations of the situation (i.e., they "split" their states). This allowed the extinction group to revert back to the original state representation when returned to the original context (renewal). This state-splitting process can be seen in Figure 4 (right panels): Agents that continued to receive reward used fewer states to represent the two situations (S0, S1) than did agents that received extinction training.
The slope of the rate of extinction depended on the extent of the difference between the two acquisition and extinction contexts. For example, in the top panels of Figure 4 , the context was not changed between conditions. However, in the lower panels, the two contexts were quite different, and extinction happened quickly. In either case, as long as the situation identifying cues did not change between the two contexts, there was no acquisition slope for agents that continued to receive reward. And in all cases, renewal of responding happened very quickly (compare renewal conditions with acquisition conditions in Figure 4 ).
Cued Renewal
When an agent is trained in one context, extinguished in another, and then returned to the first context, spontaneous renewal of responding is often seen (Bouton, 2002 (Bouton, , 2004 Bouton, Westbrook, Corcoran, & Maren, 2006) . This can also be seen in cued associations; animals are likely to "spontaneously recover" responding to a cue they have not been exposed to for a long time (Pavlov, 1927; Rescorla, 2004; Robbins, 1990) . This cued renewal of responding is thought to underlie cued relapse to addiction (Childress, Ehrman, Rohsenow, Robbins, & O' Brien, 1992; Childress et al., 1993; Childress, McLellan, Ehrman, & O'Brien, 1988; O'Brien, Childress, McLellan, & Ehrman, 1992 ). In our model, extinction primarily proceeds by re-representation of a situation as a new state. Thus, extinction does not remove the association previously stored. Presenting a cue that suggests to the agent that it is in the original situation (rather than in the new situation) will renew responding, even if no reward is presented. In Figure 5 , the agents renewed responding when returned to Context A. Because The agent learns to make responses that lead to rewards (i.e., taking Action 1 in Situation 0 [S0]). Extinction: Some agents no longer receive reward for responding (gray line), whereas other agents continue to receive reward for responding (black line). Renewal: Agents were all then returned to getting reward for taking Action 1 in S0. (Right panels): Number of states used. In the top panels, the agent remained in the same context (A) through all three conditions. In the lower panels, the agent was moved from Context A to Context B between conditions. A color version of this figure is available on the Web at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/[articleDOI].supp no reward was given in the renewal condition, extinction then proceeded normally in Context A.
PREE
When an agent is trained with partial reinforcement, the agent is slower to extinguish its response (Capaldi, 1957; Domjan, 1998) . Our simulations also show this effect (see Figure 6 ). In our model, slowed extinction after partial reinforcement arises because the agent has learned that nonrewarded conditions can occur during partial reinforcement. Thus, when the agent does not receive reward during the extinction condition, it takes longer to determine that the extinction condition is different and will require a different situation representation (a "splitting" of the state). This is very compatible with Capaldi and colleagues' suggestion that extinction arises from a discrimination between acquisition and extinction conditions (Capaldi, 1957 (Capaldi, , 1958 Capaldi & Birmingham, 1998; Capaldi & Lynch, 1968) .
The Role of Discrimination in PREE
Early theories explained the PREE as a consequence of the ability of the animal to discriminate between the acquisition and extinction conditions (Domjan, 1998 ). These theories were tested by interposing a continuous reinforcement condition (in which the animal was always rewarded for responding) in between the partially reinforced acquisition condition and the extinction condition. Under the simplest discrimination hypothesis, this interposed continuous reinforcement should always enable the discrimination of the extinction condition and should remove the PREE (Domjan, 1998) . However, interposing fully reinforced conditions did not remove the PREE (Jenkins, 1962; Theios, 1962) .
In our model, the PREE does arise from a stronger ability to discriminate between fully reinforced and extinction conditions than between partially reinforced and extinction conditions. In our simulations, interposing an intervening fully reinforced condition does not remove the PREE. (See Figure 7. ) As above, this is because the partially reinforcing condition includes unrewarded responses. The interposing fully reinforcing condition does not remove the memory of the partially reinforced condition, which allows the animal to discriminate between the current observations (in the extinction condition) from previous experience (i.e., the acquisition condition). Thus the agent continues to show a PREE.
Discussion
The theory put forward in this article explains acquisition and extinction as two interacting learning processes: a storage of new associations, driven by positive ␦ signals (signaling reward, positive value larger than expected, leading to acquisition) and a splitting of the state space, driven by low tonic ␦ signals (signaling disappointment, a lack of delivered expected positive value, leading to extinction). This theory suggests that the decision as to whether to act after extinction is not a decision-process questionShould I act or not?-but rather a cognitive question-Which situation am I in?
This new theory captures the time course of acquisition via standard TDRL associative learning processes. The time course of extinction, however, arises from probabilities of recall. Whether the representation is always either in a specific state and the slow decay time course of extinction occurs via averaging over trials (as suggested, e.g., by Gallistel, Fairhurst, & Balsam, 2004) or whether the believed state of the world is somehow mixed proportionally between states producing probabilistic action selection (as suggested, e.g., by is still an open question. In any case, in our model, renewal occurs via a sudden return of the representation of the world to the original state (s) from which the agent expected to receive reward. The time course of renewal would then depend on the probability of entering the state in which the agent expects reward over other potential states.
Relation to Other Models of Extinction and Renewal
Current theories of extinction in both psychology and neuroscience (Bouton, 2002 (Bouton, , 2004 Bouton et al., 2006; Delameter, 2004; Milad & Quirk, 2002; Myers & Davis, 2002; Quirk et al., 2006; Rescorla, 2004) are based on the addition of new variables, often identified as contextual (Bouton, 2002 (Bouton, , 2004 Bouton et al., 2006) or inhibitory (Delameter, 2004; Pavlov, 1927) . In any content-addressable memory, the cues provide inputs from which a unique state can be recalled. Our theory suggests that the "inhibitory cues" are simply the new cues that serve to disambiguate the original state s from other states. This may explain why "inhibitory cues" are always modulatory and are often contextual (Bouton, 2004; Delameter, 2004 )-they do not serve to instantiate a new state, but rather to differentiate the new state from the old state. Acquisition in these theories, however, is based on simple conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus associations and do not have the explanatory power that the temporal difference model does.
Computational models in which acquisition is based on temporal difference learning rules handle extinction by unlearning O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; Pan, Schmidt, Wickens, & Hyland, 2005) . Although all three of these models capture both acquisition and extinction, only the O'Reilly and Munakata (2000) model captures a renewal that is faster than acquisition. It does so by using a ␦ rule with threshold units. The prediction unit decreases its activity in response to missing rewards only until it drops below activation. Because the input weight matrix remains just below threshold, a single reward can retrigger responding (bringing it back above threshold). However, because the prediction unit waiting below threshold needs a positive ␦ signal to drive it back above threshold, the O'Reilly and Munakata model will not show a response to nonrewarded associated cues and cannot explain contextual or spontaneous recovery of responding (Bouton, 2002 (Bouton, , 2004 Rescorla, 2004; Robbins, 1990) . Because extinction occurs by unlearning of the input weights to the prediction unit, extinction speed in the O'Reilly and Munakata model is inversely proportional to the partial reinforcement rate. Contrary to the animal behavior literature (Capaldi, Figure 6 . The partial reinforcement extinction effect. P ϭ probability; R ϭ reward. Error bars show standard error of the mean measured over simulations (n ϭ 50). A color version of this figure is available on the Web at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/[articleDOI].supp 1957; Domjan, 1998) , in the O'Reilly and Munakata model, agents that receive a reinforcement at a low probability rate extinguish as fast or faster (but definitely not slower) than do animals that receive a reinforcement at high probability. This means that the O'Reilly and Munakata model cannot explain the PREE (Domjan, 1998; Pearce & Bouton, 2001 ). In particular, the O'Reilly and Munakata model has no long-term memory of past reinforcement schedules and so cannot carry effects across intervening reinforcement schedules (Jenkins, 1962; Theios, 1962) . In contrast, our model proposes that extinction follows as a consequence of changes in the state-space representation, which provides explanations for nonrewarded cued renewal (Simulation 3), for the PREE (Simulation 4), and for the continued effect of partial reinforcement across intervening reinforcement schedules (Simulation 5).
Our state-space expansion hypothesis reconciles current psychological theories of extinction with current TDRL learning theories. Our model can be seen as a mathematical instantiation of those current psychological theories, particularly those of Capaldi (1957 Capaldi ( , 1958 , who suggested that the key to extinction is the ability to discriminate between the acquisition and extinction situations. It is important to note that we have been able to model experiments that have shown that the partial reinforcement effect is not removed by an intervening continuous reinforcement schedule (Domjan, 1998; Jenkins, 1962; Theios, 1962 ). In our model, the agent's prior experience with partial reinforcement can be recalled during the Figure 7 . The partial reinforcement extinction effect continues to occur even with an intervening fully reinforced condition (CRF). P ϭ probability; R ϭ reward. Errors bars show standard error of the mean measured over simulations (n ϭ 50). A color version of this figure is available on the Web at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ [articleDOI].supp extinction training, which reduces the discriminability of the extinction training and slows down extinction (see Figure 7) . These ideas are also consistent with those of Bouton (2002 Bouton ( , 2004 , who suggested that extinction arises from secondary cues that gate new associations. Cues that discriminate between the two situations are those that differentiate the original state s from other states. These cues effectively gate the associations.
This theory provides immediate explanations for the context sensitivity (Bouton, 2004) and cue dependence (Bouton, 2004; Pavlov, 1927 ) of extinction, both of which provide cues to disambiguate state. Reinstatement by provision of unsignaled rewards (Pavlov, 1927; Rescorla, 2004; Robbins, 1990) can also be envisioned as a cued recall of the original state over other states. The presence of recent/available rewards is one of the most salient differences between states (Capaldi, 1957 (Capaldi, , 1958 Capaldi & Birmingham, 1998; Capaldi & Lynch, 1968) .
What Defines a State?
Taking the correct action in a situation requires solving a classification problem-the agent must identify the set of previous situations that are similar enough to the current situation in order to make predictions about value and consequences of its actions. Once the agent has made this classification, it can make decisions about actions. Without this classification, agents will show random responses.
This classification is fundamentally a memory process and requires a model of memory encoding and retrieval. The agent has to both identify the important cues and use them to retrieve the appropriate situation categorization. Cues, particularly in the real world, are ubiquitous. Some of these cues are reliable and can provide consistent definitions of situations. Other cues are unimportant, unreliable, or inconsistent. The mechanisms that control reliability are complex and beyond the scope of this article. Clearly, an agent needs to differentiate reliable from unreliable cues. However, whether a cue becomes fundamental to the definition of a situation is likely to depend on factors beyond mere reliability, such as novelty, salience, and other factors (Collett, 1987; Gallistel, 1990; Knierim et al., 1995; Pearce & Bouton, 2001) . Cues can also modulate the interpretation of other cues (Domjan, 1998) . The extent to which cues serve as separate elements or as configurations is still vigorously debated (Delameter, 2004; Domjan, 1998; Pearce, 1994; Pearce & Bouton, 2001; Rescorla, 2003) .
How agents use cues to recognize internal states or "situations" is a very large open question, and is beyond the scope of this article. Fundamentally, however, the final action must be unitaryeither an agent takes an action or it does not. That final action reflects a categorization. Whether that unitary action also reflects a unitary state is an open question (Daw, 2003; Daw et al., in press, 2006; Doya et al., 2002) . The results in this article follow from the hypothesis that this situation classification problem is fundamentally a memory process and that it requires a balance between encoding and retrieval.
Context
In our model, the state categorization is based on both the quickly changing cues (e.g., s W ) as well as slowly changing contextual cues. Because our model uses the mutual information between the cues and the states to determine the attention to the cue (cue weight, w k ; Equation 5), cues that do not change are ignored. Thus, context is ignored in Simulation 1 because it does not change at all. Even when context does change in Simulation 2, attention to it is paid only when states start to split. The definition of context is highly complex and depends on issues of spatial and temporal continuity and scale (Cassaday & Rawlins, 1997; Fuhs, VanRhoads, Casale, McNaughton, & Touretzky, 2005; Hirsh, 1974; Hirsh, Leber, & Gillman, 1978; Nadel, , 1995 Nadel & Willner, 1980; Nadel et al., 1985; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; see Redish, 1999 , for a review), but this model provides one potential explanation for the difference between contextual and standard conditioning stimuli-contextual cues change slowly and provide little information to the immediate decision making that must occur within the context. Similarly, this provides an explanation for the role of contextual cues in conditioning (Bouton, 2002 (Bouton, , 2004 )-contextual cues only come into play when agents need to differentiate actions in response to similar stimuli occurring in different contexts.
When Are Representations Split? When Are Values Unlearned?
In the model proposed in this article, ␦ Ͻ 0 can produce two effects: It can drive the TDRL component to reduce a learned (associated) value back toward 0 (i.e., unlearning), or it can drive the state-classification component to reinterpret the set of cues as a new state (i.e., state splitting). Both of these processes are available to our model. These two processes, however, can be dissociated by their different effects on renewal. If a value is unlearned, then renewal is the same as relearning and will occur with the same time course as the original learning. In contrast, if the state classification of the cue set has changed, then the original state is still available; a process that drives the agent to use the original state classification will produce essentially instant renewal. In the simulations presented above, which process will occur is entirely dependent on the state-classification process. If the classification of the cue set changes, the original value is left intact. If the classification of the cue set does not change (i.e., the agent continues to use the original state), then the original value will be unlearned. In our simulations, the state-classification process appears faster than the unlearning process, therefore the simulated agents tend to extinguish by state reclassification rather than by unlearning.
That being said, it is likely that under some conditions, agents may prefer not to reclassify situations and will show unlearning rather than state splitting. In a recent article, Myers, Ressler, and Davis (2006) tested the contextual reinstatement of fear in rats that experienced extinction trials 10 min, 1 hr, 24 hr, or 72 hr after acquisition.
5 They found that animals in the 10-min and 1-hr groups did not show subsequent renewal (suggesting the animals had in fact forgotten the association), whereas the animals who had 24 hr or 72 hr between acquisition and extinction showed strong subsequent contextual renewal as well as a higher probability of spontaneous renewal (suggesting the animals had not forgotten the original association). Do all memories require 24 hr to solidify such that when the animals are reexposed to the same situation, extinction proceeds by state reclassification rather than by unlearning? We find this highly unlikely. Certain extremely salient events can produce unforgettable associations, even though they occur only once. For example, people who have received shocks from implanted cardiodefibrilators often make surprising associations that can produce severe fear and anxiety (Bourke, Turkington, Thomas, McComb, & Tynan, 1997; Godemann et al., 2001; Hamner, Hunt, Gee, Garrell, & Monroe, 1999) . In our current model, we have not included an explicit solidification parameter; all agents and all simulations used the same classification mechanism. State reclassification depended on ␦ and tended to occur before unlearning could take place. Thus our simulated agents reclassified situations rather than unlearned associations. It is possible that this time course difference seen by Myers et al. (2006) reflects consolidation (Gais & Born, 2006; Smith, 1995; Teng & Squire, 1999) , long-term potentiation (LTP) processes (Huang & Kandel, 1995; Lynch, 1998; Lynch, Rex, & Gall, in press; Sajikumar & Frey, 2004) , or some other process providing stabilization of representation in the stateclassification system. Extensive theories have suggested that changes in memory storage can occur over very long time scales (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Squire, 1987) , but this literature is beyond the scope of this article. Memory stability would likely be related to the strength of the association, as evidenced by Wang, Marin, and Nader (2005) . We suggest that the balance between extinction by reclassification and extinction by unlearning depends on the specific parameters of the association, including the time elapsed since the association was made; the salience, surprise, and magnitude of the events; as well as the internal parameters such as attention, stress, and sleepconsolidation processes. In any case, our theory implies that the key to differentiating between state-reconsolidation and unlearning processes is exactly the classic question: Can the association be renewed?
This viewpoint on extinction also provides an entry into the reconsolidation phenomenon: Both extinction and reconsolidation require memory retrieval (Ouyang & Thomas, 2005) , and both require protein synthesis (Berman & Dudai, 2001; Eisenberg, Kobilo, Berman, & Dudai, 2003; Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000; Suzuki et al., 2004; Vianna, Szapiro, McGaugh, Medina, & Izquierdo, 2001 ). Recently acquired memories are susceptible to manipulations during retrieval (Berman & Dudai, 2001; Myers et al., 2006; Nader et al., 2000; Suzuki et al., 2004) ; however, for well-established memories, it is the extinction process that is susceptible to manipulations (Eisenberg et al., 2003) . We suggest that these effects may arise from the difference between poorly established and well-established memories. Poorly established memories are susceptible to unlearning (thus an unreinforced recall combined with protein synthesis inhibitors reduces the stored association). However, extinguishing behaviors arising from well-established memories requires the storage of a new state. Thus, extinction of strongly stored memories requires new learning, and the extinction rather than the original memory is susceptible to protein synthesis inhibitors.
What Is the Effect of Extinction on Other Available Actions?
The model as presented here first categorizes the available cues into a state or situation and then decides upon the most appropriate action given that categorization. This means that in our model, extinguishing one action in response to a stimulus will have the effect of extinguishing all actions in response to the same stimulus. To our knowledge, the effect of extinction of one action in response to a cue on the taking of other actions in response to the same cue is still an open question. It is important to note that the agent's state is a categorization derived from the immediately available cues. Thus the agent's state categorization includes both the immediate conditioning stimuli (tone, light, etc.) as well as the contextual cues (environment, slowly changing cues, etc.). Just because the model splits the state derived from one stimulus in a context (e.g., tone), this does not mean that it must split the state derived from another stimulus in the same context (e.g., light).
An additional possibility is that states are never represented separately from actions: That is, representations of states are really state-action pairs. Recent evidence from midbrain dopamine recordings in monkeys suggests that phasic dopamine signals encode not just state-action pairs, but actually, the entire state-actionreward-state-action set (Morris et al., 2006; Niv et al., 2006a) . If all situations are encoded as state-action pairs, then state splitting due to disappointment would (by definition) only apply to the action with disappointing consequences. States in our model as implemented are based entirely on the available cue set and do not include actions in the state definition, but our theory is agnostic as to whether states are based solely on cues or whether they include an expected (or recent) action component.
Anatomical Instantiations
The TDRL component. Most models of TDRL's anatomical instantiation are based on models of the basal ganglia in general and of the striatum in particular (Barto, 1995; Doya, 2000a Doya, , 2000c Foster, Morris, & Dayan, 2000; Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave, 2001a , 2001b Houk, Davis, & Beiser, 1995; Johnson & Redish, 2005; Montague et al., 1996; Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999; Samejima, Ueda, Doya, & Kimura, 2005; Suri & Schultz, 1999) . Striatal neurons have been found to represent key parameters of the temporal difference reinforcement learning algorithm (e.g., situation-action associations; T. D. Barnes et al., 2005; Carelli & West, 1991; Daw, 2003; Gardiner & Kitai, 1992; Hikosaka et al., 1999; Hikosaka, Nakamura, & Nakahara, 2006; Jog, Kubota, Connolly, Hillegaart, & Graybiel, 1999; Kermadi & Joseph, 1995; Kermadi, Jurquet, Arzi, & Joseph, 1993; Matsumoto, Hanakawa, Maki, Graybiel, & Kimura, 1999; Miyachi, Hikosaka, Miyashita, Kárádi, & Rand, 1997; SchmitzerTorbert & Redish, 2004; Tremblay, Hollerman, & Schultz, 1998) , reward delivery (Daw, 2003; Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish, 2004; White & Hiroi, 1998) , and value signals (Daw, 2003; Kawagoe, Takikawa, & Hidosaka, 2004; Nakahara, Itoh, Kawagoe, Takikawa, & Hikosaka, 2004) . The fMRI data from humans playing sequential games show similar correlates to value, ␦, and other parameters of these models in striatum (McClure et al., 2003; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004; O'Doherty et al., 2004; O'Doherty, 2004; O'Doherty, Buchanan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Seymour et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004) . These data suggest that the TDRL component likely resides primarily within the basal ganglia.
The ␦ signal. Extensive research has implicated a role for dopamine in reward learning (Schultz, 2002; Wise, 2004) . In particular that phasic bursts of dopamine signal differences between expected and observed changes in value (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz, 2002; Waelti et al., 2001) . Unexpected rewards or reward-predicting stimuli produce phasic bursts of activity in dopaminergic neurons, whereas undelivered rewards or stimuli that predict that an expected reward will not be delivered produce pauses in the baseline firing of dopaminergic neurons (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz, 2002; Waelti et al., 2001 ). For both positive (value higher than expected, indicated by increases in dopamine-cell firing rate) and negative (value lower than expected, indicated by length of pause in firing) value-prediction errors, Bayer and Glimcher (2005) found that the dopamine signal was related to the magnitude of the error. Fast-scan voltammetry has confirmed that these changes are reflected (although transformed; Montague et al., 2004; Ungless, 2004) in extracellular dopamine levels (Stuber, Wightman, & Carelli, 2005) . These data suggest that phasic bursts of dopamine are likely to carry the ␦ signal (Barto, 1995; Montague et al., 1995 Montague et al., , 1996 .
The situation-categorization component. Correct action within a situation requires the recognition that the situation is similar to previous situations Sutton & Barto, 1998) . This is, fundamentally, a memory-retrieval and categorization problem. Extensive work in categorization problems have implicated the cerebral cortex in such processes (e.g., Fuster, 1997; Kéri, 2003; Kohonen, 1980; Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996) .
Our theory suggests that extinction arises from changes in this categorization function. Although changes in sensory cortical representations have been seen with learning (Myers & Davis, 2002; Weinberger, 1998) and with changes in dopamine levels (Bao, Chan, & Merzenich, 2001) , we find it unlikely that such changes will occur at the level of initial sensory processing. Much more likely would be to see changes in representations in structures that subserve more flexible representations, such as prefrontal cortex and hippocampus (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Fuster, 1997; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Redish, 1999; Robbins, 2005) . Lesion, stimulation, and recording evidence suggest a direct role for the medial prefrontal cortex in the addition of new signals to drive extinction (Lebron, Milad, & Quirk, 2004; Milad & Quirk, 2002; Quirk et al., 2006; Sotres-Bayon, Cain, & LeDoux, 2006) . A role for the hippocampus in reversal learning has been known since the 1970s (Hirsh, 1974; Hirsh et al., 1978; Isaacson, 1974; Nadel & Willner, 1980; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978) . Hippocampal lesions interfere with the contextual dependence of extinction and remove the ability of context to renew responding (Bouton et al., 2006) . The hippocampus provides a direct projection to medial prefrontal cortex (Ferino, Thierry, & Glowinski, 1987; Jay, Burette, & LaRoche, 1995; Jay & Witter, 2004) , which may allow it to provide contextual signals to the prefrontal representation.
As noted above, current theories of extinction have suggested that extinction arises from the addition of new variables, identified as "inhibitory" (Delameter, 2004; Pavlov, 1927) or "contextual" (Bouton, 2002 (Bouton, , 2004 . The data examining prefrontal effects on amygdala associations suggest a role of prefrontal cortex in the addition of new "inhibitory" signals (Milad, Vidal-Gonzalez, & Quirk, 2004) . In contrast, hippocampal activity and hippocampal integrity have both been implicated in the representation and processing of contextual cues (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Redish, 1999) . One possibility is that animals have two mechanisms through which the state classification can be changed: a prefrontal mechanism providing the addition of new variables to the classification problem (set shifting: Robbins, 2005 ; dimension augmentation: Grossberg, 1976 ) and a hippocampal mechanism providing a change in the systemic representation of the underlying context (remapping: C. A. Barnes, Suster, Shen, & McNaughton, 1997; Bostock, Muller, & Kubie, 1991; Redish, 1999; Sharp, Blair, Etkin, & Tzanetos, 1995; Wills, Lever, Cacucci, Burgess, & O'Keefe, 2005) . In any case, we suggest that the flexibility of representations in the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus provides the animal with an ability to change the state classification function, which provides the animal with the ability to associate similar situations with new states with which new values can be associated.
We did not explicitly model frontal cortex or hippocampus in our model. Instead, the implementation of state in the model was based on a very abstract competitive-learning model of state spaces. However, many models of categorization learning have been based on a similar prototype-centered process much like that used here (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Hertz et al., 1991; Kéri, 2003; Lakoff, 1990) . This model can be conceptually translated into standard distributed (neural) models of cortex and hippocampus (Arbib, 1995; Durstewitz, Kelc, & Gunturkun, 1999; Durstewitz, Seamans, & Sejnowski, 2000; Redish, 1999; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Seamans, Gorelova, Durstewitz, & Yang, 2001; Seamans & Yang, 2004) .
We assume that the state hypothesis is represented through distributed encoding across an autoassociative network. The specific details of the autoassociative network are irrelevant to the general hypothesis put forward here, but we note that there is a large family of autoassociative networks with the necessary properties (Hertz et al., 1991) . The key properties are (a) that cells with similar representations should be coupled with excitatory connections, which provides completion for an incomplete input (Hertz et al., 1991; Hopfield, 1982; Kohonen, 1980) , (b) global, or nearglobal, inhibition, which provides for competition between possible representations (Grossberg, 1976; Hertz et al., 1991; Wilson & Cowan, 1973) , and (c) excitatory inputs on the main cells with associative learning (e.g., LTP) across the inputs, which provides for storage and recognition of input cues (Hertz et al., 1991; Hopfield, 1982) . Such networks fall into three major families: cell assemblies, in which small, but separate groups of cells support each other (Hebb, 1949; Marr, 1971; McNaughton & Nadel, 1990) ; attractor networks, in which a continuous representation is identified along a dimension, and the recurrent excitatory coupling follows a unimodal kernel such that cells with similar preferred values are preferentially coupled (Kohonen, 1980; Laing & Chow, 2001; Redish, 1999; Wilson & Cowan, 1973) ; general autoassociators, such as the Hopfield (1982) , Willshaw (Willshaw, Bruneman, & Longuet-Higgins, 1969) , or Kohonen (1980) networks, in which all cells are coupled and learning occurs across the recurrent connections. In these networks, incomplete and nearby patterns will settle to one of a subset of final patterns (Hertz et al., 1991) . The stable, final states carry remembered information and can serve as representations of the world that can be used to drive value and action processing in TDRL. The set of similar patterns that settle to the same final state define a basin of attraction. The resistance of this final state to noise defines the depth of the basin and can be said to form a sort of inertia in the system. We propose that once the agent has acquired a learned association, the network has formed a deep basin of attraction. When the agent repeatedly receives ␦ Ͻ 0, some process occurs that effectively moves the currently observed cues c(t) outside the basin of attraction for the memory of the situation s. This can occur either by shrinking the basin of attraction or by increasing the distance between the currently observed cues and the prototype. (The model as implemented above uses the second process.) This allows a second, slightly changed input to retain its own representation (e.g., sЈ) and not to fall into the original basin (s). As the agent learns to correctly accommodate the new state (s), the error signal returns to 0, and the system will now have two separable basins of attraction, differentiating the two states s and sЈ. Further differentiation between the states will occur via the competitive learning that arises from the recurrent inhibitory connections.
Identifying changes between states. Changes between states can be directly identified neurophysiologically through the measurement of changes in tuning curves. A tuning curve is a categorization: The set of stimuli for which the cell fires is a categorization of the world. For example, a place field is a categorization of situations: Changes in place fields without changes in explicit stimuli encode a change in the categorization of the situation occurring at that location (remapping; Redish, 1999; Touretzky & Redish, 1996) . This remapping can be seen after important events in an animal's experience (Moita, Rosis, Zhou, LeDoux, & Blair, 2004; Sharp et al., 1995) . Dopamine D1/D5 (ant)agonists change the likelihood for place cells to remap with situational changes (Kentros, Agnihotri, Streater, Hawkins, & Kandel, 2004) .
Deficits in initiation and storage of new states will also produce observable effects in behavior. An inability to recall situations (an overwillingness to create a new state) will appear as an inability to learn (i.e., responses will be random). An inability to recognize a change in situations (an underwillingness to create a new state) will appear as an inability to change responses or to extinguish those responses (i.e., as response perseveration). Experimentally, D1/D5 agonists produce response perseveration (Floresco & Phillips, 2001; Seamans & Yang, 2004; Zahrt, Taylor, Mathew, & Arnsten, 1997) , whereas D1/D5 antagonists lead to random responding (Seamans, Floresco, & Phillips, 1998; Seamans & Yang, 2004) .
The ␦ signal. In our theory, ␦ signals disappointment-the lack of expected reward. It is a signal that one's expectations are incorrect. We propose that agents handle this signal by assuming that the situation has changed, and a new situation categorization must be identified. This has the key benefit of keeping the previous situation category around should it become useful again.
In our model, ␦ is a running estimate of ␦ Ͻ 0. It has the effect of changing the situation-categorization component. We can thus predict that the ␦ signal will control the stability of the situationcategorization component's state space. As ␦ decreases (because the agent is not receiving the expected reward), the agent should become more willing to categorize the situation as new (i.e., the agent should become more willing to split the state space). If ␦ is high (because the agent is receiving the expected reward), the agent should be less willing to change its situation categorization (i.e., the agent should be unwilling to categorize the situation as new). As noted above, any mechanism that increases a split in the state space can be controlled by ␦ . We have explored changing the exploration/exploitation parameter ␤, changing the acceptable width of the radial-basis function s and changing the attention to cues w k .
Humans and animals can show different balances between exploration and exploitation (Daw, O'Doherty, et al., 2006; Doya, 2000b) . Animals faced with extinction conditions often increase their responding to the stimulus and also can show increased exploration (Domjan, 1998; Ferster & Skinner, 1957) . Although increases in ␤ with changes in ␦ did not disrupt our results, they also were unnecessary to the results shown in this article. Therefore, we did not include a dependence of ␤ on ␦ in our simulations. Identifying the dependence of ␤ on ␦ will require more detailed and specific neural models and analyses.
The most obvious way to force a splitting of state would be to decrease the acceptable width of the radial-basis function s ) with decreases in ␦ . Thus, as the agent found itself to be losing expected reward, it would become less willing to categorize an observed set of cues as part of a known memory. However, in practice, we found this to be a highly unstable mechanism to drive state-space splitting in our simulations. Very small changes in s made agents split states into hundreds of states and made it difficult to learn multiple environments. It is possible that with more accurate neural simulations (which are based, e.g., directly on attractor network dynamics; Durstewitz et al., 1999 Durstewitz et al., , 2000 Tanaka, 2006) , these sorts of changes will be stable and could be a mechanism driving the influence of ␦ on state spaces.
In practice, we found that the most stable mechanism to drive state splitting in our model was to increase the agent's attention to cues by increasing the w k parameter with decreases in ␦ .This made the agent more sensitive to any real changes in cues (e.g., a change in context) but also more sensitive to nonreal changes in cues (e.g., changes caused by noise).
What signals ␦ ? Dopamine neurons pause in firing with unexpected decreases in value (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Ljungberg et al., 1992; Ungless, Magill, & Bolam, 2004) . Thus tonic levels of dopamine could carry the necessary information-when dopamine levels tend to be low, the agent is not getting the expected value from its actions and should reconsider its expectations. However, the model that we have implemented in this article is based on changes in attention, which may be more similar to the effects of changes in norepinephrine or acetylcholine levels (Aston- Jones, Chiang, & Alexinsky, 1991; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Hasselmo, 1993; Hasselmo & Bower, 1993; Yu & Dayan, 2005) . The simplest anatomical instantiation of ␦ would be to have a direct consequence of tonic dopamine levels on state-space stability. Just such a model has been proposed by Seamans and Yang (2004) . Both the cortex and the hippocampus have large numbers of dopamine receptors. Dopamine (ant)agonists affect representational (in)stability in both the frontal cortex (Zahrt et al., 1997) and the hippocampus (Kentros et al., 2004) .
In the hippocampus, dopamine D1/D5 antagonists decrease the stability of place fields in mice across days, whereas dopamine D1/D5 agonists increase the stability of place fields (Kentros et al., 2004) . As noted above, changes in the set of cells firing at a specific location are indicative of changes in the situation catego-rization within that environment. This would be evidenced as changes in place field stability.
In the frontal cortex, both D1 agonists and D1 antagonists impair memory function (the classic "inverted-U curve" of performance; Zahrt et al., 1997) . D1 agonists produce response perseveration (Floresco & Phillips, 2001; Seamans & Yang, 2004; Zahrt et al., 1997) , whereas D1 antagonists produce random responding (Seamans et al., 1998; Seamans & Yang, 2004 ). As noted above, response perseveration will occur when an animal is unwilling to consider new hypotheses (i.e., when it is unwilling to expand the state space). Random responses will occur when an animal was unwilling to consider that the situation is similar to previous situations (i.e., overwilling to expand the state space).
Dopamine works through diverse mechanisms to modulate excitation and inhibition within cortical networks (Arnsten, Cai, Murphy, & Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Durstewitz et al., 1999 Durstewitz et al., , 2000 Floresco & Phillips, 2001; Murphy, Arnsten, Goldman-Rakic, & Roth, 1996; Seamans et al., 1998 Seamans et al., , 2001 Seamans & Yang, 2004; Zahrt et al., 1997) . In a recent review, Seamans and Yang (2004) concluded that slow dopamine signals to the cortex provide a "tone" that controls the depth of the cortical attractor. With high dopamine, basins of attraction become deep, and representations have more inertia and tend to be difficult to dislodge. With low dopamine, basins of attraction become shallow, and representations have less inertia and tend to shift to new representations more easily. This is also analogous to the "gain" hypothesis put forward by Servan-Schreiber, Printz, and Cohen (1990) : With high dopamine, active cells tend to stay active, and inactive cells tend to remain inactive, thus making it more difficult to change the representation. This suggestion is also akin to that of Goto and Grace (2005) , who suggested (in their supplemental material) that low tonic dopamine arising from undelivered rewards "may underlie the ability to switch to a new strategy for achieving a goal" (p. 2). Goto and Grace's (2005) data also directly support our low tonic dopamine hypothesis in that decreases in tonic levels of dopamine increased the effect of prefrontal cortical stimulation on nucleus accumbens. It is interesting to note that they found no effect of changes in tonic dopamine on the hippocampal effect on nucleus accumbens. Instead, they found that increases in phasic dopamine signals increased hippocampal effects on the accumbens, whereas decreases had no significant effect. This may be because the prefrontal cortex is only recruited into the process during extinction (Milad & Quirk, 2002; Milad et al., 2004) , whereas the hippocampus always provides input to accumbens functionality. D1/D5 agonists stabilized hippocampal representations (Kentros et al., 2004) and increased the effect of hippocampal stimulation on the accumbens (Goto & Grace, 2005) , whereas D1/D5 antagonists destabilized hippocampal representations (Kentros et al., 2004) . It may be that low tonic dopamine drives the hippocampus to find a new contextual representation that is then used to cue decision making once rewards are found again. These questions require more detailed experiments directly examining the effect of extinction on prefrontal and hippocampal representations and the effect of extinction on prefrontal and hippocampal signaling into the accumbens.
However, few studies have looked at direct measures of tonic dopamine. These studies have found tonic dopamine signals more related to uncertainty, with increases in tonic dopamine more related to decreases in certainty (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003 , and changes in representation (Stefani & Moghaddam, 2006) , than to our ␦ signal. Other theories have suggested a role for tonic dopamine as a baseline signal (such that phasic increases are measured against it; Daw, 2003; Grace, 1991 Grace, , 1995 O'Reilly & Frank, 2006) , as a measure of the uncertainty in the delivery of reward (Fiorillo et al., 2003) , as a measure of response vigor and motivation (Niv et al., 2006a (Niv et al., , 2006b , as an enabler of learning (such that without tonic dopamine, learning becomes fixed; Gutkin, Dehaene, & Changeux, 2006) , and as having a role in the general issue of attention (Young, Moran, & Joseph, 2005) .
An interesting possibility is that dopamine may actually carry three signals, a burst signal carrying ␦ Ͼ 0, a pause signal carrying ␦ Ͻ 0, and a tonic signal carrying another alternative signal (average reward, response vigor, attention, etc.). In our model, the key parameter would likely be the pauses, signaling value worse than expected, leading to behavioral extinction through a changing of the situation-categorization function.
Other neuromodulators. Of course, dopamine is not the only neuromodulator to play a role in learning. Many neuromodulators, including (but not limited to) acetylcholine, serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine, have been implicated in changes in learning (Doya, 2000b (Doya, , 2002 Hasselmo, 2005; Hasselmo & Bower, 1993; Yu & Dayan, 2005) . Yu and Dayan (2005) examined the effects of uncertainty on learning models. They noted differences between expected and unexpected uncertainty. In our model, the threshold s for categorizing a cue observation c(t) with a state s and the cue-attention parameter w k reflect expected uncertainty. In our model, ␦ reflects unexpected uncertainty in that it reflects a lack of expected reward. It might be possible to obtain similar results with a direct measure of uncertainty. Yu and Dayan placed the signal for expected uncertainty in acetylcholine signaling and unexpected uncertainty in norepinephrine signaling. Yu and Dayan argued for a cholinergic role in measuring cue validity and thus attention to a cue (analogous to the role ␦ plays in our w k term). In fact, Yu and Dayan (2002) explicitly suggested a role for acetylcholine in controlling the width of a radial-basis field in a hidden Markov model of learning.
A likely candidate for the ␦ signal is also norepinephrine. Both the frontal cortex and hippocampus receive noradrenergic inputs (Bouret & Sara, 2005; Jones & Moore, 1977; Kalaria et al., 1989) . Noradrenergic signaling has long been associated with novelty and stimulus significance (Aston- Jones & Cohen, 2005; Bouret & Sara, 2005) . Aston-Jones and colleagues (Aston-Jones et al., 1991; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Usher, Cohen, Servan-Schreiber, Rajkowski, & Aston-Jones, 1999) suggested a role for norepinephrine in attention, particularly in the realm of incorrect trials. Bouret and Sara (2005) proposed a role for norepinephrine in reset mechanisms, particularly in the context of reversal tasks.
Finally, it is possible that there is no external single signal carrying ␦ . Intracellular processes could integrate the dopaminergic input and thus change the stability of cellular learning in response to repeated pauses in dopamine firing. Such mechanisms are beyond the scope of this article, but we note their possibility for completeness.
Reinforcement and Aversion
Stimuli that change responding can be categorized into four separate processes: reinforcement (positive value larger than expected-leading to increased responding), disappointment (lack of expected positive value-leading to extinction), aversion (negative value larger than expected-leading to escape), and relief (lack of expected negative value-leading to extinction). This article addresses the first two and suggests that they arise from different neurobiological mechanisms and have different neurobiological consequences. Reinforcement and aversion may arise from opponent processes. Extinction of negative associations (e.g., aversion and relief) have also been well studied (e.g., cue3shock; Lebron et al., 2004; Myers & Davis, 2002; Quirk, 2002; Quirk et al., 2006) and show very similar properties to extinction of positive associations (e.g., cue3food; Bouton, 2004; Capaldi & Birmingham, 1998; Rescorla, 2004) . These similarities imply that aversive extinction is likely to also occur by a changing of the agent's representation of the world (e.g., state splitting), consistent with observations that the original association is not forgotten under aversive (fear) extinction.
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If aversion/relief work in a parallel manner to reinforcement/ disappointment, one would predict the existence of a parallel system with phasic firing increases in response to aversive stimuli and pauses in firing in response to relief. This hypothesis implies that the single reinforcement signal ␦ cannot subserve both reinforcement and aversion learning. This suggests that another signal () should exist for aversion learning, with firing patterns that represent whether the event is worse than expected ( Ͼ 0), not as bad as expected (Ͻ 0), or as bad as expected (ϭ 0). Following our suggested mechanisms for reinforcement/disappointment (␦, ␦ ), we hypothesized the existence of and terms representing aversion and relief.
Although no current signal has been identified with this term, potential candidates are likely to be monoamines like dopamine. Obvious candidates are thus serotonin (Daw, 2003; , Daw, O'Doherty, et al., 2006 and norepinephrine. Although neither current recordings of norepinephrine signals (Aston- Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Alexinsky, 1994; Clayton, Rajkowski, Cohen, & Aston-Jones, 2004 ) nor current theories of norepinephrine function (Aston- Jones & Cohen, 2005; Bouret & Sara, 2005) are compatible with the term, both recordings and theories are based on data from the locus coeruleus. Whether norepinephrine signals from other noradrenergic structures (e.g., A1, A2) carry aversive signals is still unknown. However, norepinephrine is known to be necessary for conditioned taste aversion (Miranda, LaLumiere, Buen, Bermudez-Rattoni, & McGaugh, 2003) , and norepinephrine from the A1 and A2 noradrenergic cell groups projecting to the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis is critically involved in opiatewithdrawal aversion (Aston-Jones, Delfs, Druhan, & Zhu, 1999; Delfs, Zhu, Druhan, & Aston-Jones, 2000) . Norepinephrine signals directly inhibit dopamine firing, producing distinct pauses (Paladini & Williams, 2004) .
Negative stimuli, such as tail-pinch and shock, produce reliable pauses in dopamine signaling (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996; Ungless et al., 2004 ). An implication of the ␦ Ͻ 0-implies-statesplitting hypothesis is thus that aversive learning could produce state splitting. As noted above, aversion could also be learned by either the association of an appropriate action (such as an escape), reducing back to 0. Moita et al. (2004) have seen evidence of this. Moita et al. recorded hippocampal neurons from rats exposed to shock. In the case in which the shock was preceded by a stimulus (thus allowing the prediction of the oncoming shock), the place cells remained stable throughout the two conditions. But in the case in which the shock was not preceded by a stimulus (thus removing the possibility of prediction), the conditioning changed the place fields of a subset of cells. In the second (context) case, we would expect that the dopamine pauses continued to build up, which could have produced state splitting, evidenced by the change in representation of the environment by the place cell population.
It is important to note that the available actions in response to reinforcement and aversion are not necessarily parallel. With positive reinforcement, the agent has to find the action that led to reinforcement. With aversion, the agent has to find any action except the one that led to aversion. Escape paradigms may be more closely related to positive reinforcement paradigms in that they entail the finding of a single action. This may predict that uncorrelated rewards would not lead to the same sort of state splitting that Moita et al. (2004) found to occur with uncorrelated punishments. In cases of uncorrelated rewards, the agent can find any (or all actions) to identify with it. This can lead to superstitious behaviors (Domjan, 1998; Ferster & Skinner, 1957) . However, in the cases of uncorrelated punishments, the lack of predictable structure leads to numerous states from which actions continue to predict shock. This may have some relevance to the phenomenon of learned helplessness (Domjan, 1998; Seligman, 1972) .
Addiction and Relapse
Addictive drugs have been hypothesized to drive maladaptive decision making through pharmacological interactions with neurophysiological mechanisms evolved for normal learning systems (Everitt, Dickinson, & Robbins, 2001; Hyman, 2005; Kelley, 2004; Lowinson, Ruiz, Millman, & Langrod, 1997; Redish, 2004) . This means that models of extinction should have implications for our understanding of addiction.
Although the self-administration (acquisition), extinction, reinstatement sequence has long been used as a model of addiction and relapse, the use of this model is still controversial (Kalivas & Volkow, 2005; Katz & Higgins, 2003; Shaham et al., 2003) . The potential suddenness of relapse (Gawin, 1991) does suggest that the drug-seeking association is not forgotten. This suggests that the cessation of drug seeking may require the same processes that underlie extinction (a changing of the state space), even if the behavioral sequences leading to the changes are different. We suggest that, as with extinction, the key to recovery from addiction is a changing of the state-space representation, which allows different consequences (i.e., natural rewards predominating over drug rewards) and actions (i.e., not drug seeking) to be associated 6 An intriguing possibility that follows from this parallel mechanism hypothesis is that posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may be the negative counterpart to problem gambling. Whereas problem gambling arises from a strong reinforcing event that cannot be forgotten, PTSD may arise from a strong aversive event that cannot be forgotten. Studying similarities between PTSD patients and problem gamblers may lead to a deeper understanding of how the extinction process breaks down.
with the new state. The mechanism by which the categorization of situation changes might be different (i.e., it might depend on ␦ Ͻ 0 for animals experiencing extinction training, but might depend on top-down executive functions in humans attempting to break an addiction), but the consequences are the same: Similar contexts and cues are associated with alternate representations.
Relapse, then, occurs when the neural representation falls back into the old state, returning to the original representation, which leads to an overvalued addictive path to drug use (Redish, 2004) . As with extinction processes, this implies that relapse will be particularly sensitive to context and other cues that can drive the representation back to the original representation. Consistent with these predictions, drug craving and relapse are strongly influenced by drug-associated cues (Childress et al., 1988 (Childress et al., , 1993 and by context . This learning-theory explanation of relapse is independent of whether the association produces positive desire for drugs (Jaffe, 1992; O'Brien et al., 1992; Redish, 2004; Wise, 2004) or negative symptoms that need to be relieved (Jaffe, 1992; Koob & Le Moal, 2001; O'Brien et al., 1992) . In either case, relapse occurs when the representation returns to the original state s and makes the pathway to drug use available again.
Two other factors that increase the probability of relapse are reexposure to the drug (Shaham et al., 2003) and stressors (Sinha, Catapano, & O'Malley, 1999) . Reexposure to the drug will have detectable internal effects (Kamien, Bickel, Hughes, Higgins, & Smith, 1993; Meyer & Mirin, 1979; Tarter, Ammerman, & Ott, 1998) , the set of which provide strong cues to differentiate state. Stress may carry cue signals that relate to drug seeking (driven by the postdrug withdrawal, which often drives immediate drug seeking; Gawin, 1991; Koob & Le Moal, 2001) . It is interesting that stress does not increase the likelihood of reinstantiation of foodseeking behavior after extinction of lever pressing for food and only reinstates drug seeking in the drug-taking environment (Shalev, Highfield, Yap, & Shaham, 2000) .
Whether or not the cessation of drug seeking is well modeled by extinction, we suggest that non-drug-seeking addicts are not seeking drugs for the same reason that animals are not behaving after extinction training: They have represented the world by different states that have different associated consequences and values. Relapse, then, occurs through the same mechanism as reinstantiation of extinguished behaviors-a return to the original representation s, which leads to a return to drug seeking.
Our tonic dopamine hypothesis suggests that recovered addicts will be particularly susceptible to relapse if they have low dopamine levels. In the tonic dopamine hypothesis presented above, high dopamine makes the current state stable, whereas low dopamine makes the current state unstable. In this case, the new non-drug-seeking state is the current state, thus low dopamine would increase instability, making the agent more likely to fall out of the current state sЈ and more likely to relapse to the original state s.
Problem Gambling
The different consequences of unexpected gains (␦ Ͼ 0, producing acquisition) and unexpected losses (␦ Ͻ 0, leading to decreasing ␦ , producing state splitting) lead to important consequences of variable reward processes, such as gambling: A sequence of unexpected wins can produce anomalous expectations that will not be unlearned by subsequent losses.
Many compulsive gamblers start with a very big strike or a statistically unlikely sequence of wins and then are faced with many small losses (Custer, 1984; Wagenaar, 1988) . A big unexpected strike would produce a very large positive ␦ and would create a general association with the actions leading to the reward. Presumably, the large strike would be a very salient event. Because subsequent losses lead to ␦ Ͻ 0, which leads to state splitting, subsequent losses will not remove the expectation of winning, but will instead produce alternate, special-case states identified with the losses.
We have modeled this using our basic world (Figure 2 ). Agents were first provided with 250 time steps in which the costs of playing outweighed the rewards. Then agents experienced 100 time steps in which rewards dramatically outweighed the costs. Finally, agents experienced 250 time steps in the original condition (costs outweighed rewards). Cues remained identical under the three conditions. We found that the larger the payout, the more likely the agent was to split states in response to the subsequent losses. (See Figure 8. ) In our simulations, this occurred because the larger the payout, the more likely ␦ was to drive state-space splitting before the payout could be unlearned. Once the states split, the agent was trapped in a relapse-extinction sequence in which they responded at high rates, quit, and then responded again. In particular, even a single small win could produce a dramatic relapse to responding, which was not seen before the winning streak (Figure 8) .
In order to simulate the cost of playing, a small cost was applied to each time the agent took Action 1 in any situation. After a large payout, agents continued to play, even at substantial cost. The most significant predictor of the size of the postwin losses was the total amount won during the winning streak (stepwise linear regression, coefficient non-zero, P Ͻ 10 Ϫ10 , reduced root-mean-square error [RMSE] from 13.30 to 9.90). Other factors that played a predictive role included the variance in the number of wins (Step 2, coefficient non-zero, P Ͻ 10 Ϫ8 , reduced RMSE to 9.50), and the number of wins (Step 3, coefficient non-zero, P Ͻ 10 Ϫ7 , reduced RMSE to 8.70). Also considered, but not significant, were constant factors ( p Ͼ .99) and the variance in the payout ( p Ͼ .39). Of course, the key to the value-association process is not the actual dollar amount of the payout, but the internal representation within the agent. Thus, agents who experience rewards more strongly than do others may be more susceptible to problem gambling. Our model suggests that anyone can become a problem gambler but that the specifics will depend on the sequence of wins and losses experienced by the agent and the agent's reactions to those wins and losses.
The identification of losses with a new state sЈ that must be differentiated from an original state s may potentially explain the effect of "hindsight bias" (Custer, 1984; Langer & Roth, 1975; Wagenaar, 1988) , in which gamblers analyze their losses and explain them away by noting what went wrong and why they should have known they would lose. Similarly, this theory explains the "illusion of control," in which gamblers believe they can control statistical situations (Custer, 1984; Elster, 1999; Wagenaar, 1988) , as a misclassification of a single statistical situation into multiple differentiable situations (i.e., as a problem with the situation-categorization component).
Unlike addicts, who know how to get back to their high-value goals but do not wish to, gamblers do not know how to get back to their high-value goals but are continuously trying to do so. Gamblers believe there is a way to achieve their earlier success if they could only find it. A stereotypical problem gambler is always trying to recapture his original success. The gambler is stuck, trying to differentiate s from other states, never able to achieve that magical, original state s that once led to the large reward.
Summary and Conclusion
TDRL models require two processes: a situation-categorization process, in which cues are categorized into situations, and an association process, in which values are associated with those situations. We hypothesize that the situation-categorization process reacts to the lack of delivery of expected reward by a recategorization process (i.e., a "splitting" of the state space). We show that the inclusion of this explicit situation-categorization process enables models of acquisition, extinction, and renewal compatible with the experimental literature. It provides explanations for effects of protein synthesis inhibitors on reconsolidation and extinction. It also provides explanations for relapse in addiction as well as problem gambling. This model requires a signal identifying the lack of delivered reward. We hypothesize that that signal is most likely to be reflected in tonic levels of dopamine.
